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There are reasons to think that Bhart®hari’s writings may shed light on the early history of 
Vaiße∑ika. One of these is that he obviously knew the Vaiße∑ika system. Almost all of its 
categories play a role in his work. Separate sections (samuddeßa) of the Våkyapad¥ya are 
dedicated to the categories jåti, dravya, guˆa and kriyå. The relationship called samavåya — a 
special feature of Vaiße∑ika — is mentioned and used repeatedly. Vaiße∑ika substances appear 
as ‘powers’ (ßakti), most notably kåla (time) and diß (space). 
 A second reason is Bhart®hari’s chronological position. I have argued in another 
publication that Praßastapåda’s Padårthadharmasaµgraha, as well as Dignåga’s 
Pramåˆasamuccayav®tti before it, were heavily indebted to the Ka†and¥, a work written not 
long before Dignåga. This Ka†and¥, I further argued, exerted a dominating influence on all 
Vaiße∑ika literature that came after it, including perhaps the versions of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra 
itself, not to speak of the surviving commentaries on this SËtra work.2 Bhart®hari, on the other 
hand, lived long enough before Dignåga that someone different from Bhart®hari could write a 
commentary on the first two kåˆ∂as of his Våkyapad¥ya still before Dignåga. Bhart®hari, 
therefore, lived and worked most probably before the Ka†and¥! If his work provides 
information on Vaiße∑ika, it would then be one of the very few sources of information dating 
from the pre-Ka†and¥ period of this system. 
 In what follows we shall consider some possible links between Bhart®hari’s 
Våkyapad¥ya and the Vaiße∑ika of his days. 
 
[76] 
1. The variegated colour (citrarËpa) 
 
Karl H. Potter explains the variegated colour in his Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. 
II, which deals with the tradition of Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika up to Ga∫geßa, in the following terms 
(1977: 118): “Consider a substance with a mottled surface of more than one shade. Nyåya-
Vaiße∑ika insists on treating this substance as a single entity with one color or its own, but 
                                                           
1 I thank A. Wezler and J. Houben for critical comments. The earlier articles in this series have appeared in the 
following periodicals: no. 1, Bulletin d’Études Indiennes 6 (1988), 105-143; no. 2, Studien zur Indologie und 
Iranistik 15 (1989), 101-117; no. 3, Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 45 (1991), 5-18; no. 4, Asiatische 
Studien / Études Asiatiques 46, 1 (1992), 56-80. 
2 See Bronkhorst, 1993. 
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surely it is evident that it has several colors. Does this mean that one thing can be both, say, 
red and green all over at once? Uddyotakara seems to have originated one sort of answer to 
this, which is that in the list of shades one has to count as one kind of color that called 
‘variegated color’ (citrarËpa).” 
 The problem which the variegated colour is meant to solve is clear. An object is, in 
Vaiße∑ika ontology, different from its parts; it is a completely different entity, which has, 
necessarily, a colour of its own, different from the colours of its parts. What is the colour of a 
whole whose parts do not all have the same colour? 
 The problem is inherent in the most fundamental assumption of Vaiße∑ika, and is likely 
to be as old as the system itself. Why then do we not find this particular answer until 
Uddyotakara, a Nyåya author who may have been a contemporary of Praßastapåda? 
 The reason why we don’t find the variegated colour mentioned in our earliest 
Vaiße∑ika texts appears to be that we have so few of them. There is reason to believe that the 
variegated colour played a role in the system already before Praßastapåda. 
 Otto Grohma (1975: 151 f.) has drawn attention to the passage in Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya which polemicizes against the existence of a whole cloth as different 
from its parts. Vasubandhu mentions here the variegated colour in the following lines (p. 189 
l. 24-26): “In case the threads have different colours … the cloth could not have a colour .. If 
[you accept] ‘variegated’ as its colour … there would be production of [a colour] belonging to 
a different universal (from the colours in the threads).” (bhinnarËpajåtikriye∑u tantu∑u pa†asya 
rËpådyasaµbhavåt/ citrarËpåditve vijåt¥yårambho ‘pi syåt). 
 It must be admitted that the variegated colour in this passage from the 
Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya is rather hypothetical, and does not prove beyond doubt that anyone 
known to Vasubandhu believed in it. 
 Vyomaßiva’s commentary on the Padårthadharmasaµgraha, called Vyomavat¥, cites a 
sËtra in its discussion of the variegated colour. The [77] sËtra reads:3 “Because there cannot 
be, in one non-omnipresent substance, [several] specific qualities (viße∑aguˆa) that are 
perceived by the same sense-organ.” It is not impossible that this sËtra was indeed meant to 
justify variegated colour as a quality. Unfortunately it is only known through this passage of 
the Vyomavat¥; it does not occur in the different versions of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra that have 
been preserved, nor does it appear to be cited by any other commentator. 
 For the most certain attestation of the variegated colour in early Vaiße∑ika we have to 
turn to the following verses of Bhart®hari’s Våkyapad¥ya:4 
 
Just as the single variegated colour is described by way of different [colours] such as 
blue etc., which point to divisions [in the one and indivisible variegated colour]; in the 
same way the single sentence, which is completely self-sufficient, is described by way 
of other linguistic units (viz. words) which require one another. 
                                                           
3 Vy vol. 1, p. 63 l. 20: avibhuni dravye samånendriyagråhyåˆåµ viße∑aguˆånåµ asambhavåt. 
4 VP 2.8-9: citrasyaikasya rËpasya yathå bhedanidarßanai˙/ n¥lådibhi˙ samåkhyånaµ kriyate bhinnalak∑aˆai˙// 
tathaivaikasya våkyasya niråkå∫k∑asya sarvata˙/ ßabdåntarai˙ samåkhyånaµ såkå∫k∑air anugamyate// 




It is not necessary to recall here that for Bhart®hari the sentence is the real unit of language, 
the individual words being the result of an artificial analysis. The comparison with the 
variegated colour is therefore particularly appropriate, for that colour too cannot be looked 
upon as a collection of constituent colours. The comparison further reminds us of the fact that 
Bhart®hari’s observations on the sentence as an indivisible unite are of an ontological rather 
than linguistic or psychological nature. 
 
 
2. Sound (1)5 
 
Sound (ßabda), in classical Vaiße∑ika, is a quality of ether (åkåßa). It is already described as 
such in the Padårthadharmasaµgraha of Praßastapåda, in Candramati’s *Daßapadårth¥, and in 
some of the Vaiße∑ika sËtras. The Padårthadharmasaµgraha gives the following description:6 
 
ßabdo ‘mbaraguˆa˙ ßrotragråhya˙ k∑aˆika˙ …/ sa dvividho varˆalak∑aˆo dhvani- (v.l. 
‘varˆa) lak∑aˆaß ca/ tatra akårådir varˆalak∑aˆa˙ ßa∫khådinimitto dhvanilak∑aˆaß [78] 
ca (v.l. ‘varˆalak∑aˆa˙)/ tatra varˆalak∑aˆasyotpattir åtmamanaso˙ saµyogåt 
sm®tyapek∑åd varˆoccåraˆecchå/ tadanantaraµ prayatna˙/ tam apek∑amåˆåd 
åtmavåyusaµyogåd våyau karma jåyate/ sa cordhvaµ gacchan kaˆ†håd¥n (v.l. 
ura˙kaˆ†håd¥n) abhihanti/ tata˙ sthånavåyusaµyogåpek∑amåˆåt (v.l. –åpek∑åt) 
sthånåkåßasaµyogåd varˆotpatti˙/ 
Sound is a property of ether. It is perceptible by the ear. It is momentary. … It is of 
two kinds — (1) in the form of speech sounds and (2) in the form of noise in general. 
[Sound] in the form of speech sounds is [the sounds] a etc. [Sound] in the form of 
noise in general is produced by the blowing of a conch and such things. Sound of the 
former kind proceeds from the contact of the mind and soul as influenced by 
remembrance: — First of all there is desire for pronouncing the sound; this is followed 
by an effort on the part of the speaker; and when this effort brings about the 
conjunction of the soul with wind, there is produced in this wind a certain motion; this 
wind moving upwards strikes such places as the throat and the like; this contact of the 
places of articulation and the wind brings about contact of the places of articulation 
with åkåßa; and this contact produces the speech sounds. (tr. Ga∫gånåtha Jhå, 
modified) 
 
This passage is quite clear that speech sounds are the sounds of the alphabet (a etc.) and are 
momentary. Words and phrases, on the other hand, are combinations, or rather sequences, of 
speech sounds. They present, therefore, a problem which resembles to some extent that of the 
variegated colour, discussed above. There are, however, important differences. Words and 
phrases are sequences of speech sounds, and cannot in any way be looked upon as collections 
of simultaneously existing sounds. Moreover, words and phrases do not, unlike the variegated 
colour, have a different substrate from their constituent sounds. It is further of some interest to 
note that the sËtra cited in the Vyomavat¥ and discussed above, which was supposedly meant 
                                                           
5 I thank W. Halbfass for some useful observations. 
6 N p. 287-88, Ki p. 262, Vy vol. 2 p. 237. 
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to justify the existence of the variegated colour, confines itself explicitly to non-omnipresent 
substances. It may here be recalled that ether, the substrate of sounds, is omnipresent. 
 How, then, did the Vaiße∑ikas look upon words and phrases? 
 No statements from early Vaiße∑ika texts are known to me that attribute or deny 
ontological status to words and phrases. But some passages discuss the link between words 
and the things they denote. VS 7.2.19/19/19 ßabdårthåv asambaddhau claims that “words and 
designated objects have no connection”, and VS 7.2.24/20/20 såmayika˙ ßabdåd 
arthapratyaya˙ adds that “the understanding of an object from a word is based on convention”. 
It seems clear that the presence of an ‘existent’ link between words and things is here rejected. 
This, however, would seem to imply that the ‘existence’ of words is not in doubt. 
 A similar position appears to be taken in Vyomaßiva’s Vyomavat¥. This commentary 
raises the problem that the definition of samavåya risks to [79] cover the relation between a 
word and its designated object as well, as happens in the case of the word ‘ether’ and its 
designated object.7 The solution to the problem presented by Vyomaßiva has no relevance to 
our question. The fact that he does not point out that the word åkåßa (‘ether’) does not ‘exist’ 
creates however the impression that Vyomaßiva, too, accepts the existence of whole words. 
Yet in another passage he points out that we understand the meaning ‘cow’ when we hear the 
sequence g-au-˙.8 
 Candrånanda’s commentary on Vaiße∑ika SËtra 7.2.23 (which has not parallel in the 
other versions of this text) discusses the link that exists between sound and ether, and the one 
between ether and objects. The combined link which thus exists between a word and the 
object it denotes is not accepted, because it leaves a doubt as to which object is denoted by 
which word. But Candråndanda, too, fails to point out that the designating words do not exist 
in the first place. He seems to have no difficulty accepting the existence of whole words. 
 Turning now to the Våkyapad¥ya, we notice that Bhart®hari knows the conception of 
sound as a quality of ether. This we must conclude from a number of stanzas in the 
Sambandhasamuddeßa, which discuss the relation, in Vaiße∑ika terms, between words and 
objects. We find here, for example, the following statement (VP 3.3.16ab): 
 
svåßrayeˆa tu saµyuktai˙ saµyuktaµ vibhu gamyate 
What is ‘omnipresent’ is known, being in contact with [objects] that are in contact 
with its own substrate. 
 
We know from the Padårthadharmasa∫graha (Ki p. 148 l. 16; N p. 141 l. 5; Vy vol. 2 p. 72 l. 
19) that omnipresent objects have no mutual contact. We may therefore conclude that ‘its own 
substrate’ is omnipresent. But it seems certain that ‘it’ is sound (more precisely, the word 
                                                           
7 Vy vol. 1 p. 26 l. 13-17: tathå hy åkåßaßabdenåkåßam abhidh¥yaa ity anayor ådhåryådhårabhåve sati 
våcyavåcakabhåva˙ …/ tadvyavacchedårtham avadhåraˆam ådhåryådhårabhËtånåm eva ya˙ saµbandha˙ sa 
samavåya iti. 
8 Vy vol. 2 p. 241 l. 23-25: yatra yatra gakåraukåravisarjan¥yånåm itthambhËtånupËrv¥m upalabhase, tatra tatra 
gotvavißi∑†o ‘rtha˙ pratipattavya˙ pratipådayitavyaß ceti sa∫ketagrahe sati tathåvidhaµ ßabdam upalabhamånas 
tam arthaµ pratipadyate pratipådayati ceti. See also the discussion on p. 184 f. 
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vibhu ‘omnipresent [object]’); it would be difficult to make sense of the surrounding stanzas 
without this assumption. This in its turn means that sound has as substrate an omnipresent 
substance, which can only be ether. From stanza 3.3.13 we learn, moreover, that the relation 
with the own substrate is [80] samavåya (samavåyåt sva ådhåra˙ … prat¥yate); that is to say, 
the relation between the word ‘ether’ and ether is samavåya. Sound is therefore clearly looked 
upon, in this passage of the Våkyapad¥ya, as a quality of ether. 
 But this passage does more than this. Like the passages from Vyomaßiva and 
Candrånanda discussed above, and like the Vaiße∑ika SËtra itself, it does not appear to find 
fault with the idea that whole words (such as vibhu ‘omnipresent [object]’ and åkåßa ‘ether’) 
are treated as ‘existing’ entities, about the ‘existence’ of whose links with the denoted objects 
one can reasonably discuss.9 
 It may be worthwhile to recall at this point that there were thinkers in the age 
concerned who did not look upon words as entities in their own right. An example is found in 
the Íåbara Bhå∑ya, the classical commentary on the M¥måµså SËtra which is probably earlier 
than the Padårthadharmasa∫graha.10 According to this text words are nothing but collections 
of speech sounds, which alone ‘exist’. This point of view is introduced in the so-called 
V®ttikåragrantha on sËtra 1.1.5, and attributed to someone called Upavar∑a.11 
 
 
3. Sound (2) 
 
There is a further problem with sound in early Vaiße∑ika. The Vaiße∑ika sËtra that enumerates 
all the qualities, no. 1.1.5, does not mention sound, nor several of the other qualities that 
figure in the classical list. Instead of the classical number of 24 qualities, it lists 17 of them. 
This smaller number is confirmed by the Jaina author Jinabhadra, in his 
Viße∑åvaßyakabhå∑ya.12 We are entitled to assume that the Vaiße∑ika sËtras that do mention or 
treat sound as a quality are later additions to the text. Their removal offers valuable insights 
into the earlier construction of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. 
[81] 
 These sËtras occur in two groups, in Óhnika 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The first group 
follows sËtra 2.1.20/19/20 which presents leaving and entering a place as the inferential mark 
of ether (ni∑kramaˆaµ praveßanam ity åkåßasya li∫gam).13 This inferential mark is rejected in 
the then following group of sËtras, and replaced by another inferential mark, sound, which is 
proved to be a quality of ether. This whole discussion — which covers sËtras 21-26 in 
                                                           
9 Bhart®hari does not even hesitate to speak about the universals residing in (whole) words; see Bronkhorst, 1991: 
9 f. 
10 There are reasons to think that Bhart®hari did not yet know the Íåbara Bhå∑ya; see Bronkhorst, 1986, 1989. 
11 Frauwallner, 1968: 38: atha ‘gaur ity atra ka˙ ßabda˙? gakåraukåravisarjan¥yå iti bhagavån upavar∑a˙/. 
Compare this passage with the one from the Vyomavat¥ cited above. 
12 See Halbfass, 1980: 285 n. 55; Wezler, 1983: 36 n. 5. 
13 Compare this with “giving room” (avakåßadåna), mentioned as mark of ether in the (according to Ruben, 
spurious) Nyåya sËtra gandhakledapåkavyËhåvakåßadånebhya˙ påñcabhautikam; see Ruben, 1928: 64. 
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Jambuvijaya’s edition, 20-30 in Thakur’s, and 21-27 and 30-31 in Sinha’s — is therefore 
added onto another, older inferential mark meant to prove the existence of ether. Since ether is 
enumerated as one of the substances in sËtra 1.1.4, we may safely assume that in earliest — or 
at any rate, earlier — Vaiße∑ika the motion of leaving and entering a place were deemed to 
prove the existence of the substance ether. This conclusion also teaches us to regard with 
suspicion any discussions that may occur within the body of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. 
 Sound is again discussed in Óhnika 2.2. The context is, again, peculiar. SËtra 
2.2.19/17/17 introduces the topic, which is doubt (saµßaya); this topic continues until 
2.2.23/21/20. Then the topic sound is introduced, in 2.2.24/22/21, and the following sËtra 25 
(it occurs only in Candrånanda’s version) makes clear that this topic is meant to illustrate a 
particular case of doubt: is sound a substance, an action, or a quality (tasmin dravyaµ karma 
guˆa iti saµßaya˙)? This illustration now steals the show completely, and is the sole topic of 
discussion — according to the commentators — until the end of the Óhnika. It seems clear 
that this long excursus on sound is an intrusion into the text, and that Adhyåya 2 originally 
ended with a discussion of ‘doubt’. 
 Vaiße∑ika, then, underwent a change in its conception of sound. The new conception, 
according to which sound is a quality of ether, is already known to Nyåya SËtra 1.1.12-14. 
Caraka Saµhitå, SËtrasthåna I.49, moreover, enumerates the Vaiße∑ika qualities in such a 
manner that it is clear that its author knew the expanded list: mention is made of guru, etc., 
and we may conclude that sound, too, was considered a quality.14 All this suggests that the 
change took place at a rather early date. 
 However, Jinabhadra’s Viße∑åvaßyakabhå∑ya states in so many words that the number 
of Vaiße∑ika qualities is 17, as we have seen. This text [82] may have been composed in the 
year 609 C.E.,15 i.e., much later than Bhart®hari. It appears, therefore, that the earlier 
conception of sound existed for a long time side by side with the one that came to replace it. It 
is, for this reason, not impossible that it was still known to Bhart®hari. 
 Before we deal with this question, we must address another one: what conception did 
early Vaiße∑ika have of sound? 
 Note first that it is not possible to assume that the author of sËtra 1.1.5, which 
enumerates the qualities, simply overlooked sound. Such an argument may be possible in the 
case of ‘heaviness’ (gurutva), ‘fluidity’ (dravatva), ‘viscidity’ (sneha), and the other qualities 
(saµskåra, dharma, adharma) that do not figure in the original list. Sound it too obviously a 
‘thing’ — besides colour, taste, smell, and touch, all of them accepted as qualities in early 
Vaiße∑ika — not to be given a place in the Vaiße∑ika scheme of what there is. 
 What then was sound? Given the Vaiße∑ika ontological scheme, it must have been a 
substance, a quality, and action, a universal, a particular, or the special type of relationship 
which is called samavåya. It seems clear that, out of this list, sound can only belong to the 
                                                           
14 Cf. Adachi, 1990: 909 (35); Narain, 1976: 108 f. 
15 Chatterjee, 1978: 109. Unfortunately I have had no access to the Viße∑åvaßyakabhå∑ya. 
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categories substance or quality. Since quality is excluded, sound must then have been looked 
upon as a kind of substance. Which substance? Vaiße∑ika enumerates nine substances, among 
them the five elements earth, water, fire, wind and ether. If we are forced to make a choice, 
wind (våyu) seems most appropriate. It seems therefore a priori not unlikely that for the early 
Vaiße∑ikas sound was a form of wind. 
 The link between sound and wind is obvious where speech sounds are concerned. The 
Padårthadharmasaµgraha explains how the movement of wind plays a crucial role in the 
production of speech sounds in the passage which we studied in the preceding section. A verse 
cited in the V®tti on Bhart®hari’s Våkyapad¥ya describes the same process in almost the same 
terms, with this difference that here wind itself is stated to become sound:16 
[83] 
labdhakriya˙ prayatnena vaktur icchånuvartinå/ 
sthåne∑v abhihato våyu˙ ßabdatvaµ pratipadyate// 
The wind set in motion by the effort corresponding to the desire of the speaker, strikes 
at the different places of articulation and is transformed into sounds. (tr. Iyer, 
modified) 
 
The parallelism between these two passages, combined with the fact that icchå (desire) and 
prayatna (effort) are qualities of the soul in the Vaiße∑ika scheme of things, suggests that the 
quoted stanza in the V®tti draws upon Vaiße∑ika ontology, and may even express a Vaiße∑ika 
point of view. This point of view, however, is that wind becomes sound, in other words, that 
sound is wind. 
 Consider now the following passage of the Padårthadharmasaµgraha. It reads, in the 
translation of Ga∫gånåtha Jhå (p. 129):17 
 
Sound cannot be the property of those substances that can be touched — (1) because, 
being perceptible, its production is not preceded by any quality in the material cause of 
the substance (to which it belongs); (2) because it does not pervade over, and is not 
coeval with, the substance to which it belongs; (3) because it is perceived elsewhere 
than in the substratum wherein it is produced. It cannot be regarded as belonging to the 
soul, (1) because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ; (2) because it is 
perceived by other souls; (3) because it is not found to inhere in the soul; and (4) 
because it is perceived as apart from all idea of ‘I’. It cannot be the quality of space 
(diß), time and mind, (1) because it is perceptible by the ear, and (2) because it is a 
viße∑aguˆa (a special quality). And thus the only substance to which it could belong as 
a quality, and be a distinguishing feature of, is åkåßa. As the distinguishing feature of 
sound is common to all åkåßa, this is regarded as one only. From this unity follows its 
                                                           
16 Ed. Iyer, Kåˆ∂a 1, p. 173; included in Rau’s edition as 1.111. Íabara’s Bhå∑ya on M¥måµså sËtra 1.1.22 
ascribes to the Íik∑åkåras the words: våyur åpadyate ßabdatåm. (D’Sa, 1980: 79 n. 8, surprisingly, ascribes this 
position to the Vaiße∑ikas; see however further below.) Íabara makes a further remark which may explain how 
sound could be conceived of as wind: våyav¥yaß cec chabdo bhaved våyo˙ saµniveßaviße∑a˙ syåt “If sound were 
made of wind, it would be a special configuration of wind”. The idea that sound is wind occurs elsewhere, too; 
cp. Somånanda’s Íivad®∑†i 2.36: våco våyvåtmatå na kim? 
17 Pdhs Ki p. 71-74, N p. 58, Vy vol. 1 p. 108: ßabda˙ pratyak∑atve saty akåraˆaguˆapËrvakatvåd 
ayåvaddravyabhåvitvåd åßrayåd anyatropalabdheß ca na sparßavadviße∑aguˆa˙/ båhyendriyapratyak∑atvåd 
åtmåntaragråhyatvåd åtmany asamavåyåd aha∫kåreˆa vibhaktagrahaˆåc ca nåtmaguˆa˙/ [ßrotragråhyatvåd 
vaiße∑ikaguˆabhåvåc ca na dikkålamanasaµ/ pariße∑åd guˆo bhËtvå åkåßasyådhigame li∫gam/] 
ßabdali∫gåviße∑åd ekatvaµ siddham/ tadanuvidhånåd ekap®thaktvam/ vibhavavacanåt paramamahat parimåˆam/ 
ßabdakåraˆatvavacanåt saµyogavibhågåv iti/. The part in brackets has been omitted in Ki, no doubt by mistake. 
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individual separateness or isolation. åkåßa being spoken of as vibhu (omnipresent or 
all-pervading), it points to its dimension being the largest or highest. In as much as 
åkåßa is spoken of as the cause of sound, it follows that it has conjunction and 
disjunction. 
 
Every sentence in this passage reflects a Vaiße∑ika sËtra;18 this is not [84] however indicated. 
Yet it is Praßastapåda’s habit to give an indication to that effect when he refers to a sËtra. The 
final portion of our passage illustrates this. Consider the sentence “åkåßa being spoken of as 
vibhu, it points to its dimension being the largest or highest”. This refers to sËtra 7.1.28/24/22: 
vibhavån mahån åkåßa˙ “because of its omnipresence ether (åkåßa) is large”. The sËtra 
contains an argument (if perhaps a bad one), which Praßastapåda could have simply repeated. 
Instead he invokes the authority of the sËtra. This only makes sense on the assumption that 
Praßastapåda prefers referring to a sËtra to repeating its contents on his own authority. 
 This assumption, if correct, has far-reaching consequences. It implies that all the other 
sËtras whose contents are repeated in this passage, were not yet recognized as such by 
Praßastapåda. In other words, some of the sËtras which describe sound as a quality were not 
yet considered sËtras by Praßastapåda. Others, to be sure, were. The Padårthadharmasa∫graha 
(Ki p. 235 l. 1-3; N p. 239 l. 14-16; Vy vol. 2 p. 200 l. 14-15) cites VX 2.2.26/x/ 22 from a 
‘ßåstra’, most probably from the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. Moreover, Praßastapåda expresses in no 
uncertain terms that he looks upon sound as a quality. 
 Our passage refers explicitly to two sËtras. The first one has already been discussed. 
The second one cannot but be 2.2.36/30/31: saµyogåd vibhågåc chabdåc ca ßabdani∑patte˙ / -
ni∑patti˙ “sound originates from conjunction, from disjunction, and from (other) sound”. We 
may assume that this second sËtra was accepted as such by Praßastapåda, and may therefore 
be older than at least some of the sËtras which describe sound as a quality. With this in mind 
we turn to Bhart®hari’s Våkyapad¥ya. 
 Consider Våkyapad¥ya 1.105: 
 
ya˙ saµyogavibhågåbhyåµ karaˆair upajanyate/ 
sa spho†a˙ ßabdajå˙ ßabdå dhvanayo ‘nyair udåh®tå˙// 
Others declare that the spho†a is what is produced by the organs [of speech] by means 
of contact and separation; the sounds born from [this initial] sound are the dhvanis 
 
Note the similarity of this verse, at least of certain parts of it, with the Vaiße∑ika sËtra 
(2.2.36/30/31) which appears to be old. It seems likely that [85] Bhart®hari had this sËtra in 
mind when he wrote the verse. Our next question must be: how is this verse to be 
understood?19 
                                                           
18 Compare with the preceding note the following sËtras (2.1.24-26) found in Jambuvijaya’s edition: 
kåraˆaguˆapËrva˙ kårye guˆo d®∑†a˙, kåryåntaråprådurbhåvåc ca ßabda˙ sparßavatåm aguˆa˙/ paratra samavåyåt 
pratyak∑atvåc ca nåtmaguˆo na manoguˆa˙/ li∫gam åkåßasya. Corresponding sËtras are found in the other two 
versions of the text. The version edited by Sinha contains some additional elements in the sËtras 2.1.27, 30-31: 
pariße∑ål li∫gam åkåßasya/ ßabdali∫gåviße∑åd viße∑ali∫gåbhåvåc ca/ tadanuvidhånåd ekap®thaktvaµ ceti/. SËtra 
28 refers back to 1.2.18 salli∫gåviße∑åd viße∑ali∫gåbhåvåc caiko bhåva iti. 
19 See in this connection also Bronkhorst, 1991: 14 f. 
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 To begin with, note that this verse describes the opinion of ‘others’. It offers, by doing 
so, an alternative to the opinion of ‘some’, which is presented in the preceding verses. The 
first of these preceding verses is nr. 1.96, which reads:20 
 
Some consider that the spho†a is the universal revealed by the various individual 
instances, and they consider that the individuals belonging to this [universal] are the 
dhvanis. 
 
We see that two alternatives are placed side by side. According to the first alternative, the 
spho†a — that is the real, eternal word — is a universal; according to the second one the 
spho†a is produced by the speech organs. But what is produced by the speech organs? Several 
factors combine to show that the spho†a, on the second alternative, is some form of substance 
(dravya). 
 Recall, to begin with, that for Bhart®hari the world has two sides: the one called real 
and eternal, the other unreal and non-eternal. Regarding the real, eternal side, Bhart®hari does 
not care much what we call it. Some consider the eternal aspect of an object to be its 
universal, others its substance. We are free to choose, as long as we agree that every object 
has an eternal aspect. The second verse of the Jåtisamuddeßa (3.2) states therefore:21 
 
In the analysis of objects denoted by words, the eternal objects denoted by all words 
have been described as ‘universal’ or as ‘substance’. 
 
The remainder of the Jåtisamuddeßa occupies itself with the alternative that the eternal part of 
all objects is its universal; the then following Dravyasamuddeßa takes up the alternative view 
that substance constitutes their eternal part. 
 What is true for all ‘things’, is true for words, too. The real, eternal part of words is 
either a universal or a substance; both views are acceptable. The conclusion cannot but be that 
the verse (1.105), which appears [86] to draw its inspiration from the Vaiße∑ika sËtra, 
concerns the spho†a as substance. 
 This conclusion is confirmed by verse 1.110, which is one of the verses that elaborate 
the notions introduced in 1.105. This verse states how different schools of thought conceive of 
sound:22 
 
Some accept that sound is wind, [others] that it is atoms, [others again] that it is 
knowledge; for in the presentations the different points of view are endless. 
 
The identification sound = knowledge looks puzzling at first. But obviously any idealistic 
school of thought will maintain that substance derives its reality from, is nothing but, thought 
or knowledge. In fact, Bhart®hari himself says so in a passage of his commentary on the 
                                                           
20 VP 1.96: anekavyaktyabhivya∫gyå jåti˙ spho†a iti sm®tå/ kaißcid vyaktaya evåsyå dhvanitvena prakalpitå˙// 
21 VP 3.1.2: padårthånåm apoddhåre jåtir vå dravyam eva vå/ padårthau sarvaßabdånåµ nityåv evpavarˆitau// 
22 VP 1.110: våyor aˆËnåµ jñånasya ßabdatvåpattir i∑yate/ kaißcid darßanabhedo hi pravåde∑v anavasthita˙// 
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Mahåbhå∑ya.23 We may conclude that the three points of view according to which sound is 
wind, atoms, and knowledge respectively, share in common that sound is substance. 
 We have seen that the view in which sound it knowledge must belong to an idealistic 
school of thought. The view that sound is atoms is part of the world-view of the 
Sarvåstivådins and the Jainas.24 Remains the view according to which sound is wind. The fact 
that Bhart®hari appears to refer to a Vaiße∑ika sËtra in this very passage, suggests that this 
view belonged to the early Vaiße∑ikas. 
 It would seem, then, that Bhart®hari knew indeed both the positions of Vaiße∑ika with 
regard to sound: the more recent one according to which it is a quality of ether, and the older 
one according to which it is wind. 
 One final observation. Bhart®hari may not yet have known Íabara’s Bhå∑ya on the 
M¥måµså SËtra.25 He may therefore be earlier than Íabara, or roughly contemporaneous with 
him. For Íabara, sound is eternal and resides in the omnipresent ether. The fleeting sounds we 
hear are manifested, and not produced by the speaker who utters them. In this context Íabara 
adds the following intriguing remark:26 “But for him who [87] believes that [contacts and 
separations] produce [sounds rather than manifest them], contacts and separations, which 
occur in wind, will produce [sounds] nowhere else than in wind, because they subsist in wind; 
just as yarns produce a cloth in the yarns themselves.” Íabara’s ideas are frequently close to 
those of the Vaiße∑ikas, so that it is possible to believe that he had the Vaiße∑ikas in mind 
while writing this passage. For the Vaiße∑ikas do indeed believe that sounds are produced, not 
manifested. It is therefore possible that Íabara, too, still know of Vaiße∑ikas who believed that 
sound is wind. 
 
 
4. The omnipresent soul27 
 
VS 5.2.18-20 read, in Candrånanda’s version: 
 
5.2.18: kåyakarmaˆåtmakarma vyåkhyåtam 
5.2.19: apasarpaˆam upasarpaˆam aßitap¥tasaµyoga˙ kåryåntarasaµyogåß cety 
ad®∑†akåritåni 
5.2.20: tadabhåve saµyogåbhåvo ‘prådurbhåva˙ sa mok∑a˙ 
 
                                                           
23 CE I p. 22 l. 19-20, AL p. 27 l. 4-5. Sw p. 32 l. 11-13: ‘dravyaµ hi nityam’/ nitya˙ p®thiv¥dhåtu˙/ p®thiv¥dhåtau 
kiµ satyam/ vikalpa˙/ vikalpe kiµ satyam/ jñånam/ … 
24 For a description of the way in which, according to the Sarvåstivådins, sound joins other atoms in order to 
form a molecule, see La Vallée Poussin, 1980: I: 144-145. For the position of the Jainas, see Jaini, 1920: 118 
(Tattvårtha SËtra 5.24). 
25 See note 10, above. 
26 Íabara on sËtra 1.1.13 (p. 93 l. 5-6): yasya puna˙ kurvanti tasya våyav¥yå˙ saµyogavibhågå våyvåßritatvåd 
våyu∑v eva kari∑yanti, yathå tantavas tantu∑v eva pa†am. 
27 Some of the questions here discussed have also been dealt with in a paper called “Mysticisme et rationalité en 
Inde: le cas du Vaiße∑ika” (Bronkhorst, 1993a). 
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The first of these sËtras has a different form in the Vyåkhyå edited by Thakur: 
kåyakarmaˆåtmakarmadharmayor anupapatti˙ (5.2.16); as observed by A. Wezler (1982: 
659), it is difficult to make satisfactory sense of this reading. Nothing corresponding to this 
sËtra is found in the version known to Ía∫kara Mißra. The remaining two sËtras, on the other 
hand, occur in the other versions with only insignificant variations.28 
 Candrånanda’s explanation of these sËtras contains some suspect features, most 
notably the following: 1) Candrånanda interprets åtman in 5.2.18 to mean wind (våyu). 2) In 
his interpretation 5.2.19 is about the manas. A straightforward interpretation of the sËtras 
would rather suggest that 5.2.18 talks about the activity of the soul (åtmakarman), and that 
5.2.19 continues this topic and therefore talks about the soul too.29 Regarding 5.2.19 we know 
that already Praßastapåda interpreted it like Candrånanda: his Padårthadharmasa∫graha refers 
to this sËtra in the [88] context of the description of the manas, in order to show that the 
manas can have saµyoga and vibhåga.30 Note in passing that Praßastapåda’s remark shows 
that he looked upon VS 5.2.19 as a sËtra. Elsewhere in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha it is 
pointed out that the two activities of the manas called apasarpaˆa and upasarpaˆa are the 
result of contact between the soul and the manas, which depends on ad®∑†a;31 again the sËtra is 
interpreted as referring to the manas. 
 There is evidence to show that the above sËtras at one time concerned the åtman and 
its activities. Consider first VS 6.2.19/18/16: åtmakarmasu mok∑o vyåkhyåta˙. Wezler (1982: 
654) observed already that this sËtra “obviously refers back to VS 5.2.20”. It does, however, 
more than just this: it suggests strongly that 5.2.20, and therefore 5.2.19 as well, concern 
åtmakarman “the activity of the soul”. 
 With this in mind we turn to Bhart®hari’s Våkyapad¥ya. The Sambandhasamuddeßa of 
this work explores the question what connection exists — to be described in Vaiße∑ika terms, 
i.e., combinations of saµyoga and samavåya — between a word and the object it designates. 
This leads to no satisfactory results. Indeed, VP 3.3.17 points out that this approach would not 
limit the designation of a word to its appropriate object. Here VP 3.3.18 counters: 
 
ad®∑†av®ttilåbhena yathå saµyoga åtmana˙/ 
kvacit svasvåmiyogåkhyo ‘bhede ‘nyatråpi sa krama˙// 
Just as the saµyoga of the soul is [only] called ‘connection of owner and owned’ with 
regard to certain objects, because ad®∑†a operates [in these cases], even though there is 
no difference [between this special kind of saµyoga and saµyoga in general], just so 
is the situation in the case of other [relations], too. 
 
This verse cannot but mean that a virtually limitless number of saµyogas of the soul is limited 
by the operation of ad®∑†a to those few which link the soul to ‘its’ body, etc. This in its turn 
                                                           
28 °p¥tasaµyogå˙ instead of °p¥tasaµyoga˙; ‘prådubhåvaß ca instead of ‘prådubhåva˙. 
29 See Wezler, 1982: 654 f. 
30 Ki p. 101 l. 16-17; N p. 89 l. 15-16; Vy vol. 1 p. 156 l. 14-15: apasarpaˆopasarpaˆavacanåt saµyogavibhågau. 
31 Ki p. 270 l. 12; N p. 308 l. 22-23; Vy vol. 2 p. 266 l. 6: apasarpaˆakarmopasarpaˆakarma 
cåtmamana˙saµyogåd ad®∑†åpek∑åt. 
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implies that, in Bhart®hari’s opinion, the soul of the Vaiße∑ikas is in contact with far more 
objects than just its ‘own’ body etc., and therefore most probably infinitely large, as it is in 
classical Vaiße∑ika. 
[89] 
 The explicit mention of ad®∑†a in this verse leaves little doubt that Bhart®hari 
paraphrases here VS 5.2.19, which he apparently considered to concern the soul. If we now 
try to translate VS 5.2.18-20 in agreement with the interpretation which Bhart®hari to all 
appearances accorded them, we get: 
 
5.2.18: The activity of the soul is explained by the activity of the body. 
5.2.19: Retreating, approaching, contact with what is eaten and drunk, contacts with 
other effects, [these functions of the soul] are caused by ad®∑†a. 
5.2.20: When there is no [activity of the soul], there is no contact [with objects that 
belong to it], no manifestation [of the soul in a body]; that is mok∑a. 
 
In view of VP 3.3.18, the contacts of the soul referred to in VS 5.2.19-20 pertain to the 
subgroup of saµyogas called ‘contact between owner and owned’. Contacts in general exist 
between each soul and every finite object, the soul being omnipresent; but these general 
contacts are no relevant in the context of ‘activity of the soul’. This ‘activity of the soul’, too, 
must be interpreted to bring about the special contacts called ‘contacts between owner and 
owned’. These special contacts are confined to the body, and so is therefore this ‘activity of 
the soul’. 
 It goes without saying that this limitation of the contacts of an infinitely large soul to a 
restricted number of objects is hard to explain in terms of the Vaiße∑ika categories. Ad®∑†a is 
meant to explain, or cover up, this mystery, and would not seem to have much to do with 
dharma and adharma, which constitute ad®∑†a in the classical system. Indeed, if ad®∑†a in VP 
3.3.18 meant dharma and adharma, also the connection between words and their meanings 
should be determined by dharma and adharma, a point of view which Helåråja rejects as 
impossible. 
 At this point we must pay attention to a passage of the Nyåya SËtra, along with 
Pak∑ilasvåmin’s Bhå∑ya (3.2.61-73 (Ónanda Óßrama ed.) / 60-72 (tr. Jhå) / 59-71 (ed. 
Ruben)).32 This passage deals with the formation of the body and with the factors that play a 
role in it. SËtra 61/60/59 gives the opinion of the author: “Its formation is due to the 
persistence of previous acts” (pËrvak®taphalånubandhåt tadutpatti˙). SËtra 67/66/65 explains 
further: “Just as karman is the cause of the formation of the body, so is it also of the 
connection [of the body with a particular soul]” (ßar¥rotpattinimittavat saµyogotpattinimittaµ 
karma; tr. Jhå). SËtras 69-73/68-72/67-71 now reject an alternative opinion regarding the 
formation [90] of the body and its connection with its soul (?). The first two of these sËtras are 
of most interest to us: 
                                                           
32 My attention was drawn to this passage by J. E. M. Houben. 




69/68/67: tad ad®∑†akåritam iti cet punas tatprasa∫go ‘pavarge 
 If [it be asserted] that the [formation of the body] is due to ad®∑†a, then [our 
answer is that in that case] even after final release there would be likelihood of 
[a body being produced]. (tr. Jhå) 
70/69/68: mana˙ (v.l. manasa˙) karmanimittatvåc ca saµyogånuccheda˙ 
 There would be no severance of connection — this being due to the action of 
mind (tr. Jhå) 
 
The then following sËtras go on to show absurd consequences of the rejected opinion, but the 
above two are most important, for they allow us to identify the rejected opinion as that of VS 
5.2.19-20, studied above. The link with VS 5.2.19 is again emphasized by the Nyåya Bhå∑ya 
on NS 3.2.70/69/68, which raises questions regarding the apasarpaˆa and upasarpaˆa of the 
manas, using exactly the terms also found in VS 5.2.19. 
 Two observations must be made here. The first concerns the interpretation of VS 
5.2.19 offered in these Nyåya sËtras. NS 3.2.70/69/68 speaks of the activity of the mind 
(mana˙karman), and this is apparently how it interpreted the Vaiße∑ika sËtra — just like 
Praßastapåda and Candrånanda, as we have seen. The second observation pertains to the 
meaning of ad®∑†a in NS 3.2.69/68/67. Ad®∑†a cannot here be identical with karman, nor even 
be the fruit of previous acts (pËrvak®taphala), because these are presented as the true causes of 
the formation of the body in sËtras 61/60/59 and 67/66/65 (see above). The author of the 
Nyåya Bhå∑ya understood this very well: he offers two interpretations of ad®∑†a, neither of 
which appears to have much to do with karman and its effects. 
 It appears, then, that NS 3.2.69-70/68-69/67-68 directly criticize VS 5.2.18-20, which 
they interpret in a way that deviates from the original interpretation. The meaning assigned to 
ad®∑†a, on the other hand, is still pre-classical. The criticism centres in a way on VS 5.2.20, 
which describes mok∑a, liberation. According to these Nyåya sËtras, liberation would not be 
possible if VS 5.2.19 were correct. 
 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Nyåya sËtras just considered must be later 
than VS 5.2.18-20, so much later that the original interpretation of VS 5.2.19 was no longer 
known, or used. This is all the more surprising since Bhart®hari, as we have seen, still knew 
the original interpretation of VS 5.2.19. Is it possible that the section NS 3.2.61-73/60-72/59-
71 was added later? 
[91] 
 This is indeed likely, for this group of sËtras constitutes an excursion which interrupts 
the regular order of topics, as was already noted by Ruben (1928: 209 n. 237). It may here 
further be observed that tad- in tadutpatti˙ (NS 3.2.61/60/59) supposedly refers to the body; 
but the body is not mentioned in the preceding sËtras! We may safely conclude that the whole 
group of sËtras constitutes a later addition to the text. 
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The results of the above investigation can be presented as follows. A verse of Bhart®hari’s 
Våkyapad¥ya allows us to catch a glimpse of the earliest interpretation of VS 5.2.18-20. It 
shows us that then already the Vaiße∑ikas looked upon the soul as infinitely large. This did not 
prevent them from speaking about the activity or movement of the soul (åtmakarman). The 
soul can be active because besides the general contact (saµyoga) which it has with every 
finite object, it can have a specific contact — described as ‘contact of owner and owned’ — 
with a restricted number of objects, primarily the ‘own’ body and all that is contained in it. 
The ‘activity’ of the soul that brings about, or maintains, these special contacts, coincides 
therefore normally with the movement of the body. In terms of the Vaiße∑ika system there is 
something very mysterious about these special contacts; this is why they are stated to be 
occasioned by ad®∑†a, the unseen. These special contacts, as well as the ‘activity’ ascribed in 
this way to the soul, can come to an end; the soul does then no longer manifest itself in a 
body. This state of the soul is called ‘liberation’ (mok∑a). 
 The implausibility of this way of speaking about the ‘activity’ of the none-the-less 
omnipresent soul is obvious. It does not surprise that the idea was discarded. But discarding 
an idea proved easier than discarding the sËtras which expressed it. This led to a 
reinterpretation of the sËtras concerned. We find the first evidence of this in a set of sËtras 
inserted at an unknown date into the Nyåya SËtra. This set criticizes VS 5.2.18-20, but while 
doing so it shows that the idea of an activity of the self had been given up. Contact between 
the soul and ‘its’ body are now ascribed to the activity of the mind (manas), which 
corresponds to the later, classical doctrine. But the interpretation of the term ad®∑†a had not yet 
reached its classical form. Ad®∑†a is not yet short-hand for dharma and adharma, which are the 
effects of karman; ad®∑†a is, on the contrary, contrasted with karman and its effects. It will be 
clear that with the interposition of a manas between a soul and its body, the mystery of the 
special relationship between the soul and its body disappears, and that, consequently, pre-
classical ad®∑†a has no more role to play in it. No wonder that our set of Nyåya sËtras attacks 
this notion. 
[92] 
 With Praßastapåda we arrive at the classical exposition of the Vaiße∑ika system, and 
apparently also at the classical interpretation of VS 5.2.18-20. It is clear that Praßastapåda 
knows at least VS 5.2.19 and considers it a sËtra. He believes, furthermore, that it concerns 
the manas. But also ad®∑†a has with Praßastapåda reached its classical meaning; it has become 
more or less identical with the effect of karman (pËrvak®taphala). Praßastapåda does no longer 
have to attack the notion of ad®∑†a; the new interpretation of this term allows him to agree with 
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